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FINDING A PATH TO RECONCILIATION: 
MANDATORY INDIGENOUS LAW, ANISHINAABE 
PEDAGOGY, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Karen Drake*
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has called on law schools in Canada 
to make Indigenous law a mandatory component of legal education. In its final 
report, the Commission provides the outline of a rationale in support of this 
call to action. This paper builds on that outline by grounding the Commission’s 
rationale in the jurisprudence on section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Articulating a comprehensive rationale is useful for at least three reasons. 
First, such a rationale can underpin a response to the claim that a required 
Indigenous law course lacks value for those students who do not intend 
to practise Aboriginal law. Second, the format and pedagogy used to teach 
Indigenous law as a mandatory subject should be informed by the rationale 
underlying the call to action. Third, this rationale dispels the concern that 
mandating the study of Indigenous law violates academic freedom.
La Commission de vérité et réconciliation a demandé aux facultés de droit 
canadiennes d’exiger que le droit des autochtones fasse partie intégrante de la 
formation de leurs étudiants. Dans son rapport définitif, la Commission donne 
un aperçu des raisons justifiant cet appel à l’action. L’auteure s’appuie sur ces 
grandes lignes pour étayer les justifications de la Commission par une analyse 
de la jurisprudence relative au  paragraphe 35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle 
de 1982. Selon l’auteure, il convient d’étoffer ces justifications pour au moins 
trois motifs. Premièrement, celles-ci peuvent donner du poids aux arguments 
avancés pour contredire ceux qui prétendent qu’un cours obligatoire de droit 
des autochtones ne serait  d’aucune valeur pour les étudiants n’ayant pas 
l’intention d’exercer ce type de droit. Deuxièmement, les raisons sous-tendant 
l’appel à l’action devraient servir de fondement pour l’élaboration du cadre 
du cours obligatoire et des outils pédagogiques connexes. Troisièmement, de 
telles justifications dissipent les inquiétudes voulant que l’inclusion obligatoire 
de cette matière au curriculum porte atteinte au principe de la liberté de 
l’enseignement.
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1. Introduction
Faculty and administrators on university campuses across Canada are talking 
about “indigenizing the academy.”1 Calls to indigenize legal education in 
particular are mounting. In 2013, the Canadian Bar Association adopted 
a resolution urging legal academics “to recognize and value Indigenous 
legal traditions within the Canadian legal system” and resolved to support 
initiatives that advance Indigenous legal traditions, including training for 
law students.2 More recently, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada released 94 calls to action aimed at promoting reconciliation 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada.3 Call to action 
#28 states:
1 See Adam Gaudry, “Paved with Good Intentions: Simply Requiring Indigenous 
Content is Not Enough” (13 January 2016), ActiveHistory.ca, online: <activehistory.
ca/2016/01/paved-with-good-intentions-simply-requiring-indigenous-content-is-not-
enough/> [Gaudry]; “Indigenizing the Academy: The Way Forward” (June 2016), CAUT / 
ACPPU, online: <www.caut.ca/bulletin/articles/2016/06/indigenizing-the-academy-the-
way-forward> [“The Way Forward”]; Douglas Quan, “‘Indigenization’ Hits Campuses 
Aiming to Give Students ‘Baseline Knowledge’ About First Nations, Metis and Inuit”, National 
Post (18 December 2015), online: <nationalpost.com> [Quan].
2 Canadian Bar Association, Council of the Canadian Bar Association, Resolution 
13-03-M: Indigenous Legal Traditions, Mid-Winter Meeting held in Mont-Tremblant, QC 
(16–17 February 2013) (John DV Hoyles), online: <www.cba.org/getattachment/Our-Work/
Resolutions/Resolutions/2013/Indigenous-Legal-Traditions/13-03-M-ct.pdf>. 
3 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada: Calls to Action (Winnipeg: TRCC, 2015), online: <www.trc.ca/
websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf>.
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4 Ibid at 3.
5 See Aidan Currie, “Carolyn Bennett Joins Call for Mandatory Aboriginal Studies 
Course: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Minister Signs U of T NSA Petition”, The Varsity 
(1 February 2016), online: <thevarsity.ca>; Annette Trimbee and Wab Kinew, “Why Canada’s 
Universities Should Mandate Indigenous Courses”, The Globe and Mail (10 December 2015), 
online: <theglobeandmail.com>; Jeremy Webber, “The Law Schools and the Future of 
Indigenous Law in Canada”, Slaw (4 August 2015), online: <www.slaw.ca> [Webber]; Chelsea 
Nash, “Mandatory Indigenous Classes Stir Debate on Implementation”, The Charlatan (11 
February 2016), online: <www.charlatan.ca> [Nash] (quoting Mac Orlando); Emily Colero, 
“U of T Strikes Truth and Reconciliation Steering Committee: Native Students’ Association 
Supports Mandatory Indigenous Studies Credit”, The Varsity (25 January 2016), online: 
<thevarsity.ca> (quoting Matthew Cappella); Michelle Gaudet, “Implement Mandatory 
Indigenous Studies the Right Way: SFU Administration Should Tailor this Subject to Each 
Specific Faculty”, The Peak (22 February 2016), online: <www.the-peak.ca> [Gaudet]; Nancy 
Macdonald, “Required Reading: Making Indigenous Classes Mandatory: At Lakehead 
University and the University of Winnipeg, Students Must Take a Course in Indigenous 
Courses to Graduate”, Maclean’s (19 November 2015), online: <www.macleans.ca> (quoting 
Kevin Settee and Cynthia Wesley-Esquimaux); Danielle Lorenz, “Why Indigenous Studies 
Programs Are Valuable For Gen Y” (16 June 2009), Talent Egg, online: <talentegg.ca/
incubator/2009/06/16/why-indigenous-studies-programs-are-valuable-for-gen-y/>; 
Danielle Lorenz, “Why Indigenous Studies Classes Are Even More Important Today” (11 
February 2013), Talent Egg, online: <talentegg.ca/incubator/2013/02/11/indigenous-studies-
classes-important-today/>; Mary Jane McCallum, “When History Needs an Intervention” 
(15 January 2016), ActiveHistory.ca, online: <activehistory.ca/2016/01/when-history-needs-
an-intervention/> [McCallum].
6 See “The Way Forward”, supra note 1 (quoting James Compton); Nash, supra note 
5 (quoting Mac Orlando & Adam Gaudry); Kate McInnes, “Should Native Studies Courses 
Be Mandatory?”, The Gateway (19 January 2016), online: <thegatewayonline.ca> (quoting 
Dwayne Donald); Gaudet, supra note 5; Sophie Sutcliffe, “Should Indigenous Courses Be 
Mandatory in University?”, The Ubyssey (21 December 2015), online: <ubyssey.ca> (quoting 
Daniel Justice) [Sutcliffe]; Mandee McDonald “Unsafe Space: The Danger of Mandatory 
Indigenous Studies Courses”, Northern Public Affairs (18 February 2016), online: <www.
northernpublicaffairs.ca>; McCallum, supra note 5; Rauna Kuokkanen, “Reconciliation and 
Mandatory Indigenous Content Courses: What are the University’s Responsibilities?” (17 
March 2016), Decolonization, Indigeneity, Education & Society (blog), online: <decolonization.
wordpress.com/2016/03/17/reconciliation-and-mandatory-indigenous-content-courses-
what-are-the-universitys-responsibilities/> [Kuokkanen]; Gaudry, supra note 1; Damien 
Lee, “Indian in a Jar?”, Zoongde (blog), online: <zoongde.com/2015/02/21/indian-in-a-jar/>; 
28. We call upon law schools in Canada to require all law students to take a course in 
Aboriginal people and the law, which includes the history and legacy of residential 
schools, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties 
and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will 
require skills-based training in intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human 
rights, and anti-racism.4
Reactions to the notion of mandatory Indigenous content range from 
enthusiastic,5 to concerned but generally supportive,6 to vehemently 
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Moira MacDonald, “Indigenizing the Academy”, University Affairs (6 April 2016), online: 
<www.universityaffairs.ca/features/feature-article/indigenizing-the-academy/> (quoting 
Andrea Bear Nicholas) [MacDonald]; Quan, supra note 1 (quoting Jill Scott).
7 See “Aboriginal Courses are Relevant to Students, So Make Them a Priority: 
Effective and Useful Courses Require a University-Wide Strategy”, Editorial, The Queen’s 
Journal (8 January 2016), online: <www.queensjournal.ca> [“Aboriginal Courses are 
Relevant”]; McInnes, supra note 6 (quoting an anonymous student); Brent Venton, 
“Clipping Freedom, Ideas at U of W”, Winnipeg Free Press (12 January 2015), online: <www.
winnipegfreepress.com> [Venton].
8 See “Aboriginal Courses are Relevant”, supra note 7. The articulation of this 
argument is consistent with the finding that among law students who did not intend to take 
a course taught from the perspective of those who “have historically lacked power in society”, 
the top reason given was that those surveyed “do not believe these courses will provide them 
with useful legal skills”: Natasha Bakht et al, “Counting Outsiders: A Critical Exploration of 
Outsider Course Enrollment in Canadian Legal Education” (2007) 45:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 667 
at 672, 710 [Bakht et al].
9 See Venton, supra note 7.
10 Gaudry, supra note 1.
11 See “Aboriginal Courses are Relevant”, supra note 7.
12 See MacDonald, supra note 6. MacDonald identifies two law programs in Canada 
that have “mandatory courses on indigenous legal issues”—the University of British Columbia 
and Lakehead University. To my knowledge, the University of British Columbia course covers 
opposed.7 Chief among the latter are claims that mandatory Indigenous 
content is at best a waste of time for students whose careers will not deal 
with Indigenous issues,8 and at worst a violation of academic freedom.9 This 
paper responds to these claims within the context of legal education—more 
specifically, it defends the claim that the study of Indigenous law should be 
a mandatory component of legal education.
As Adam Gaudry recognizes, “a clear and well-articulated rationale” 
is key to effectively implementing an Indigenous content requirement at a 
Canadian university.10 Detractors will fill a perceived void on this issue with 
the assumption that no such rationale exists and therefore students who are 
not interested in Indigenous issues should not be forced to study Indigenous 
law.11 The Canadian Bar Association and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission have each pointed towards a rationale for making the study 
of Indigenous law a mandatory component of legal education. Section 
2 develops this rationale and argues that knowledge of Indigenous law is 
required by more than just those who intend to practice in the area. 
Understanding the rationale underlying the call for a required course 
on Indigenous law is important for another reason: it will inform the 
pedagogy employed within such a course. Section 3 explores this issue and 
suggests ways to structure a mandatory Indigenous law course, based on my 
experience teaching the only mandatory, stand-alone course on Indigenous 
law in a Canadian law school.12
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both Canadian law as it affects Indigenous peoples and Indigenous laws, and as such is not 
a stand-alone course on Indigenous law. Other law schools are planning or in the process of 
implementing mandatory Indigenous content. For example, Ottawa University’s Faculty of 
Law is implementing an Indigenous law stream in September 2016, in which a “small cohort 
of self-selected first year students” will receive a curriculum that incorporates Indigenous 
laws: see Sarah Morales & Angela Cameron, “Small Steps on the Path Towards Reconciliation 
at the University of Ottawa Faculty of  Law” (8 July 2016), ReconciliationSyllabus, online: 
<reconciliationsyllabus.wordpress.com/2016/07/08/small-steps-on-the-path-towards-
reconciliation-at-the-university-of-ottawa-faculty-of-law/>; Larry Chartrand, “Indigenizing 
the Legal Academy from a Decolonizing Perspective” (2015) Ottawa Faculty of Law Working 
Paper No 2015-22, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631163> 
[Chartrand]. McGill University’s Faculty of Law is introducing a mandatory property law 
course that covers common law, civil law, and Indigenous law principles of property law: 
see Robert Leckey, “Integrating Property” (7 May 2016), ReconciliationSyllabus, online: 
<reconciliationsyllabus.wordpress.com/2016/05/07/integrating-property/>. 
13 See “Aboriginal Courses are Relevant”, supra note 7.
Section 4 rebuts the claim that mandating the study of Indigenous law 
violates academic freedom. This claim may seem compelling as long as the 
concept of academic freedom is left undefined and allowed to expand to 
encompass not only the rights but also the wishful thinking of academics. 
However, when some precision is introduced into the analysis of academic 
freedom, it becomes clear that the concern is baseless. Section 4 argues that 
mandating the teaching of Indigenous law within a law program no more 
violates academic freedom than does the mandating of constitutional law, 
property law, or any other currently required law school course.
2. Rationale for Mandatory Indigenous Law Content
Some detractors’ arguments are rooted in a misapprehension about the rationale 
underlying the call for mandatory Indigenous content. Understanding the 
true rationale, then, is vital to dispelling these arguments.
Law students sometimes complain that a mandatory course on 
Indigenous law is a waste of their time because they have no intention of 
practicing in the area.13 An unstated assumption of this argument is that no 
other compelling rationale exists, other than providing preparation for one’s 
intended practice area, for making a course mandatory. 
Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Canadian 
Bar Association articulate rationales for their respective calls to action 
and resolution. In its discussion leading up to calls to action #27 and #28, 
the Commission documents the actions taken, arguments advanced, and 
positions adopted by judges and lawyers (both Crown and some of those 
representing survivors) that created barriers to survivors receiving redress for 
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the harms they suffered14 and exhibited a lack of knowledge of the residential 
school experience.15 These events provide a rationale for certain aspects of 
calls to action #27 and #28, such as requiring lawyers and law students to 
learn the history and legacy of residential schools and to receive training in 
intercultural competency, but it is not clear how they provide a rationale for 
requiring students and lawyers to learn Indigenous law specifically. For that, 
we must turn to Volume Six of the Report, where the Commission explains 
that the residential school system was one manifestation of Canada’s policies 
of cultural genocide and assimilation.16 Reconciliation requires replacing 
these colonial policies with recognition of Aboriginal peoples’ right to self-
determination,17 which includes the right to revitalize and implement their 
own laws and governance systems.18
14 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, The Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 5, Canada’s Residential Schools: The Legacy 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015) at 204–06, 208–09 [T&RC, 
The Legacy].
15 See especially ibid at 204: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s description 
of the “crumbling skull” argument successfully employed by the Crown against survivors. 
According to this argument, damages awarded to survivors who suffered abuse at residential 
schools should be limited because the survivors had “crumbling skulls” insofar as they were 
already damaged by coming from troubled homes and so they would have experienced 
problems later in life even if they had not experienced abuse at residential school. As the 
Commission notes: “The court did not appear to consider the possibility that the life and 
home situation upon which it relied to reduce the plaintiff ’s damages may have themselves, 
been the result of residential school experiences, or past government actions” at 204.
16 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, The Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 6, Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015) at 19, 20 [T&RC, 
Reconciliation].
17 Ibid at 20. On this point, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission quotes Elder 
Fred Kelly, who explains: “If reconciliation is to be real and meaningful in Canada, it must 
embrace the inherent right of self-determination through self-government envisioned in the 
treaties” (ibid at 34). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also endorses the findings 
of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in its 2013 study entitled 
“Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 
including the finding that “The right to self-determination is a central right for indigenous 
peoples from which all other rights flow. In relation to access to justice, self-determination 
affirms their right to maintain and strengthen indigenous legal institutions, and to apply 
their own customs and laws” (ibid at 49–50).
18 Ibid at 28. For a discussion of the need to use Indigenous law to inform the 
understanding of “reconciliation”, see T&RC, Reconciliation, ibid at 11–12, 16, 46. “The 
Commission defines reconciliation as an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining 
respectful relationships” (ibid at 11). Dawnis Kennedy argues that what constitutes respectful 
relations cannot be determined solely with respect to Canadian law; Indigenous legal orders 
“are integral to understanding what constitutes respectful relations with Indigenous peoples 
and their legal orders”: Minnawaanagogiizhigook (Dawnis Kennedy), “Reconciliation 
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This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
section 35 jurisprudence. According to the Supreme Court, reconciliation 
is the fundamental purpose underlying section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982,19 which recognizes and affirms the “existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.”20 Although section 35 provides 
constitutional protection for Aboriginal and treaty rights, it does not define 
those rights; that task has fallen to the courts.21 The Supreme Court has held 
repeatedly over the past twenty-five years that the laws of Indigenous peoples 
must inform the content and interpretation of section 35 rights.22 These 
exhortations occurred as early as 1990 in R v Sparrow23 and as recently as 
2014 in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia.24 Given the Supreme Court’s 
insistence on the importance of interpreting section 35 rights through the 
lens of Indigenous laws, section 35 could have the potential to foster the kind 
of reconciliation described by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
And yet, despite these long-standing and oft-occurring exhortations, 
courts have just as often failed to give effect to Indigenous law when 
adjudicating Aboriginal and treaty rights disputes.25 Val Napoleon and 
Hadley Friedland describe the courts’ general lack of serious engagement 
with Indigenous law as follows: 
without Respect? Section 35 and Indigenous Legal Orders” in Law Commission of Canada, 
ed, Indigenous Legal Traditions (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 77 at 79–80 [Kennedy]. For 
discussions of reconciliation in the context of Indigenous–non-Indigenous relations, see 
Mark D Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will 
Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 165 at 170; Jeffery G Hewitt, “Reconsidering Reconciliation: 
The Long Game” (2014) 67:2 SCLR 259.
19 See R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der 
Peet]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at 
para 1, [2005] 3 SCR 388; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at 
para 10, [2010] 3 SCR 103.
20 Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11.
21 See John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2016) at 125.
22 See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010) at 11 [Borrows, Indigenous Constitution].
23 [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1112, 70 DLR (4th) 385.
24 2014 SCC 44 at paras 34, 35, 41, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]; see also 
Van der Peet, supra note 19 at para 40; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at 
paras 147, 148, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
25 For an exception, see R v Meshake, 2007 ONCA 337 at para 33, 85 OR (3d) 575 
(applying Ojibway “custom”—or in other words, law—regarding the circumstances in which 
a member of one Ojibway nation may hunt in the territory of another Ojibway nation).
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While Indigenous oral histories are now told in court, we have yet to see them 
actually make their way into judicial reasoning or into the written ratios in Canadian 
jurisprudence. It is one thing to simply listen to the stories and quite another thing to 
think with and through them, to identify the law they contain, and to apply them to 
pressing practical problems—thereby effecting practical consequences.26
Scholars have meticulously recounted the courts’ numerous failures in this 
regard.27 Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point. 
First, the inability of the trial judge in Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
to comprehend the laws of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en peoples has 
reached legendary status, generating a cartoon bearing his likeness.28 
At trial, the Gitksan nation tendered their adaawk and the Wet’suwet’en 
nation tendered their kungax, which are oral traditions such as stories and 
songs detailing their connection to their territory,29 in support of what was 
initially articulated as a claim for ownership of, and jurisdiction over, their 
territory and later amended to a claim for Aboriginal title.30 Chief Justice 
Alan McEachern dismissed their claims after refusing to admit some of their 
oral traditions and giving no independent weight to others.31 The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that Chief Justice McEachern’s treatment of the oral 
traditions was an error and ordered a new trial.32
Val Napoleon comprehensively documents Chief Justice McEachern’s 
struggles to treat the adaawk as law. For example, at one point Chief Justice 
McEachern became, in his own words, “alarmed” at how long it took the 
witnesses to tell their adaawk, and complained that the trial was proceeding 
at “less than a snail’s pace.”33 According to Chief Justice McEachern, “I’m 
hearing so much detail that I doubt is going to be anything more than 
26 Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job: Engaging with Indigenous 
Legal Traditions through Stories” (2016) 61:4 McGill LJ 725 at 735 [Napoleon & Friedland, 
“Inside Job”].
27 See Kennedy, supra note 18; Val Napoleon, “Delgamuukw: A Legal Straightjacket 
for Oral Histories?” (2005) 20:2 CJLS 123 at 133 ff [Napoleon, “Delgamuukw”].
28 At trial, McEachern CJ tried to dissuade one of the Gitksan elders, Antgulilibix 
(Mary Johnson), from singing a song containing her adaawk as part of her testimony. He 
finally relented but cautioned: “It’s not going to do any good to sing to me … I have a tin ear.”: 
J Edward Chamberlin, “Close Encounters of the First Kind” in John Sutton Lutz, ed, Myth 
and Memory: Stories of Indigenous-European Contact (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 15 at 24. 
The cartoon by Don Monet (1987) depicts McEachern CJ with a tin ear and is reproduced in 
Richard Daly, Our Box Was Full: An Ethnography for the Delgamuukw Plaintiffs (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2005) at 51.
29 Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at para 13.
30 Ibid at para 7.
31 Ibid at para 107.
32 Ibid at paras 107–08. To date, a new trial has not yet occurred. 
33 Napoleon, “Delgamuukw”, supra note 27 at 139.
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background assistance.”34 Later, counsel for the Gitksan chiefs explained 
that the adaawk were being tendered for the proof of their contents, and 
not as mere evidence of the beliefs held by the Gitksan people. Chief Justice 
McEachern seemed to be perplexed by this statement and became fixated on 
the part of the adaawk where, as he put it, a “supernatural bear” destroyed 
a Gitksan village.35
As Napoleon notes, the point of recounting these incidents is not to 
vilify Chief Justice McEachern.36 Indigenous laws were not a mandatory 
component of legal education when he attended law school. Presumably, 
he never took a course on Gitksan law, and no one ever taught him how 
to set aside his western ontology in order to engage with a different legal 
system based on a different ontology, one “where human and spirit worlds 
are interwoven, and all creation is spiritual.”37 He never learned the skill of 
discerning the normative principles within the adaawk or how to analyze 
the details of the adaawk as lending support to those normative principles, 
in the way that students of the common law learn the skill of discerning the 
ratio within a decision and are shown how to analyze the facts and the issues 
in a way that sheds light on the ratio.
One may wonder whether the lack of comprehension displayed by Chief 
Justice McEachern is still an issue today. After all, the Delgamuukw trial 
took place between May 11, 1987 and June 30, 1990.38 Canadian society has 
made great strides in the past twenty-five years regarding Indigenous issues, 
and we have had, since 1997, the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
admonition in Delgamuukw that Chief Justice McEachern’s treatment of the 
oral traditions was an error.39 
The answer can be found in the most recent Aboriginal title case, which 
involves the Tsilhqot’in Nation and serves as the second example. The trial 
judge, Justice Vickers, held that the evidence supported a declaration of 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid at 150.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid at 151. See also ibid at 154: “What becomes clear from the transcript is that 
the Court was not able to hear or accept the adaawk as presented—a legal and political 
institution rather than a simple cultural artefact or chronological history record. The forms 
of expression, symbolism, and inter-connections between the worlds of spirits, humans, 
and animals proved to be beyond the grasp of the Court. Consequently, McEachern CJ 
characterized much of the adaawk as mythology, not history, and in the end accorded it no 
weight as evidence” [emphasis in original]. 
38 Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991), 79 DLR (4th) 185, [1991] 3 WWR 97.
39 But see Napoleon, “Delgamuukw”, supra note 27 (arguing that “it is not at all clear 
that a new trial conducted according to the SCC’s directive would result in a substantively 
different decision” at 148).
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Aboriginal title in some areas within the territory claimed by the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, but declined to make the declaration on procedural grounds.40 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, in contrast, granted the declaration of Aboriginal 
title over most of the area designated by Justice Vickers.41 Justice Vickers’ 
attempt to engage with the law of the Tsilhqot’in Nation was admirable. He 
paid tribute to the wisdom of the Tsilhqot’in peoples’ oral traditions.42 He 
recognized that “[i]n order to truly hear the oral history and oral tradition 
evidence presented in these cases, courts must undergo their own process 
of decolonization,”43 and that this can entail setting “aside some closely held 
beliefs about the reliability of oral history evidence.”44 He was conscious 
of the need to avoid an ethnocentric approach.45 He exhibited a keen self-
awareness about his own personal bias in favour of historical accounts based 
on western-derived, written documents as opposed to Indigenous oral 
histories,46 and endeavoured to overcome that bias:
There is always a Eurocentric tendency to look for and rely on the written word. Try 
as one might, it is difficult to read these words and not see in them events as they 
really were. To follow this path in a trial of this nature would relegate oral history and 
oral tradition evidence to some lesser level of importance, contrary to the directions 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. Important as the historical documents are, I have 
attempted at all times to give equal weight to the oral history and oral tradition 
evidence.47
40 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 24 at para 7.
41 Ibid at para 153. At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Tsilhqot’in Nation sought a 
declaration of Aboriginal title over the areas where Vickers J held that Aboriginal title would 
have been established if not for the procedural issue, with the exception that the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation did not seek a declaration of Aboriginal title over the areas consisting of privately 
owned lands or that were under water (ibid at para 9).
42 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 20, [2008] 1 CNLR 
112 [Tsilhqot’in Nation trial].
43 Ibid at para 132.
44 Ibid at para 133.
45 Ibid at para 196.
46 For a general discussion of Vickers J’s treatment of the oral histories of the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, see Dwight G Newman & Danielle Schweitzer, “Between Reconciliation 
and the Rule(s) of Law: Tsilhqot’in Nation and British Columbia” (2008) 41 UBC L Rev 249 at 
266–71.
47 Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 at para 203. Similarly, in a motion decision, 
Vickers J developed a procedure for assessing the admissibility of oral history and traditions, 
and in so doing emphasized that that procedure “is really no different than similar procedures 
in other cases where a trial judge is called upon to decide whether the proffered evidence 
is to be admitted”: William v British Columbia, 2004 BCSC 148 at para 16, 24 BCLR (4th) 
296 [Tsilhqot’in Nation motion]. For a comment on this decision, see Dwight G Newman, 
“Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and Civil Justice: Analyzing the Procedural Interaction 
of Evidentiary Principles and Aboriginal Oral History” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 433.
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Justice Vickers’ decision, however, is lacking the same awareness of the 
Eurocentric tendency to privilege the common law over Indigenous law.48 
He provides a list of the stories told to him by Tsilhqot’in witnesses49 but only 
takes the most preliminary steps toward identifying normative principles 
within those stories.50 Instead, the focus of his summary is on the extent 
to which the stories refer to specific locations within the area claimed by 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation.51 He seems to assume that the stories are relevant 
to the issue of sufficiency of occupation merely insofar as they identify 
places the Tsilhqot’in people may have occupied.52 There is no concerted 
effort to identify Tsilhqot’in laws about land use within the stories and then 
apply those laws to inform the analysis of sufficiency of occupation.53 For 
example, Justice Vickers recognizes that the Tsilhqot’in people “are charged 
with the responsibility of respecting all of the land,”54 but he does not go on 
to inquire how this normative principle affects the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s land 
use, such as whether it requires not occupying or only minimally occupying 
certain areas.55 In contrast, in his article, “Making the Round: Aboriginal 
48 Similarly, for an analysis of the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada failed 
to engage with the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s law of consent in its decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, see 
Val Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 873.
49 Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 at paras 433–35.
50 See ibid at paras 666–71. Similarly, in the motion decision, Vickers J describes the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation’s creation stories as having a spiritual dimension, but not as a source of 
law: Tsilhqot’in Nation motion, supra note 47 at para 21. 
51 Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 at paras 653–71. 
52 See also John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British 
Columbia” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 701 (arguing that Tsilhqot’in law played a key role in the 
trial decision, specifically in “establishing [the] sufficiency of Indigenous social organization 
necessary to prove title” at 718–19).
53 The Supreme Court of Canada instructs trial courts to do precisely this in 
Delgamuukw, supra note 24 (holding that “if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society 
had laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of 
lands which are the subject of a claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but 
are not limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use” at para 148). Similarly, 
Vickers J considers an expert report on Tsilhqot’in laws prepared by Hamar Foster, but 
most of the laws discussed in the report appear to be about something other than land use: 
Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 at paras 426–32. The report does state that Tsilhqot’in 
“chiefs had specific lands within Tsilhqot’in territory and that these lands descended on 
some sort of hereditary principle” (ibid at para 429). From this, Vickers J concludes that 
“Tsilhqot’in people did consider the land to be their land. They also had a concept of territory 
and boundaries” (ibid). However, this conclusion does not seem to factor into his analysis of 
the sufficiency of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s occupation. 
54 Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 at para 669.
55 To be fair, it is possible to infer the operation of Tsilhqot’in law in at least one aspect 
of Vickers J’s reasoning. When assessing the sufficiency of occupation, Vickers J concludes 
that at the time of the assertion of sovereignty, the Tsilhqot’in Nation had cultivated fields 
(an indication of occupation under the common law), even though they were not cultivated 
by European standards (ibid at para 959). Rather, these “cultivated fields” were areas where 
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Title in the Common Law from a Tsilhqot’in Legal Perspective”, Alan Hanna 
provides precisely the type of analysis that Justice Vickers’ decision lacks.56 
Hanna’s article shows how the legal principles contained within Tsilhqot’in 
stories establish the validity of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s claim to their land.57 
Hanna also demonstrates that the Tsilhqot’in origin story establishes the 
jurisdiction of the Tsilhqot’in Nation over their land, and does not merely 
document places occupied by the Tsilhqot’in Nation.58 
The trial decisions of both Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation illustrate 
the rationale for requiring the study of Indigenous laws in law school. 
Again, the point is not to disparage Justice Vickers—he had the best of 
intentions. The point is that discerning law within Indigenous stories, and 
then applying those laws to new facts, are skills. For those of us educated 
and immersed in a Eurocentric worldview, learning these skills will mean 
learning to set aside our default ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic, 
and learning a different—sometimes fundamentally different—ontology, 
epistemology, ethic, and logic.59 As Aaron Mills explains, the laws and 
legal institutions of any given society are generated from and conditioned 
by the constitutional order underlying those institutions and laws, and 
that constitutional order in turn is generated from and conditioned by 
the society’s fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, including 
its ontology, epistemology, and cosmology.60 This is equally true of both 
western and Indigenous communities.61 When we attempt to engage with 
another legal system without first understanding its underlying worldview, 
Tsilhqot’in people gathered medicinal and root plants and berries (ibid). In concluding that 
these areas constituted “cultivated fields”, Vickers J noted that from the Tsilhqot’in perspective, 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation gathered the plants “in a manner that managed these resources to 
insure their return for future generations” (ibid). Although Vickers J refers to this normative 
principle as a ‘perspective’ as opposed to a ‘law’, it may be informing his willingness to apply a 
lower standard of occupation; the unstated reasoning may be that certain European notions 
of cultivation, such as those resulting in the depletion of soil, would violate Tsilhqot’in law, 
and so the Tsilhqot’in Nation should not be held to such a standard when assessing its 
sufficiency of occupation. Vickers J’s reasoning on this point, however, is not explicit.
56 Alan Hanna, “Making the Round: Aboriginal Title in the Common Law from a 
Tsilhqot’in Legal Perspective” (2013-2014) 45:3 Ottawa L Rev 365.
57 Ibid at 392–94.
58 Ibid at 377–79.
59 See Webber, supra note 5 (explaining that “we and [Indigenous law students] need 
to develop modes of translation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous institutions, so 
that non-Indigenous institutions can relate intelligibly to Indigenous modes of governance 
and structures can be established that mediate sensibly among our various legal traditions”).
60 See Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal 
Orders Today” (2016) 61:4 McGill LJ 847 at 852, 854, 862–63 [Mills].
61 Ibid at 852.
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62 Ibid at 851, 857, 883.
63 See Tsilhqot’in Nation trial, supra note 42 (Vickers J seems to acknowledge that 
this is his experience during the trial when he writes: “Courts generally receive and evaluate 
evidence in a positivist or scientific manner: a proposition or claim is either supported or 
refuted by factual evidence, with the aim of determining an objective truth. However, in 
cases such as this, the “truth” which lies at the heart of the oral history and oral tradition 
evidence can be much more elusive” at para 137; and “It should also be noted that the teller 
of these oral traditions does not, as a matter of routine, offer an explanation of the meaning 
of any particular legend. The listener is left to distill and then apply the meaning to their own 
life. This is a lifelong process and is enhanced by maturity and reflection on one’s various life 
experiences” at para 671).
64 For a discussion of additional arguments in support of including Indigenous laws 
within legal education, see Chartrand, supra note 12 at 11–18.
65 T&RC, Reconciliation, supra note 16 at 48.
66 The Canadian Bar Association’s resolution to support training for law students 
in Indigenous legal traditions explains that Indigenous legal traditions “are integral to 
the recognition and exercise” of the Aboriginal and treaty rights that have constitutional 
protection pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and yet “Indigenous legal 
traditions have not always been justly and equally applied in the Canadian legal system”: 
Canadian Bar Association, supra note 2 at 1–2. 
we (perhaps inadvertently) impose our own worldview, which results in a 
distorted conception of the other system.62
No amount of progressive-mindedness or liberal orientation alone will 
bestow the skills needed to work within a fundamentally different legal 
system or the knowledge of another nation’s ontology, epistemology, ethic, 
and logic. Lawyers and judges are not going to acquire these skills or this 
knowledge through sheer force of will or by merely having an open mind 
when presented with Indigenous stories.63 Justice Vickers did everything 
imaginable to maintain an open mind and a generous attitude toward 
Tsilhqot’in law. People need an opportunity to engage with the ontology, 
epistemology, ethic, and logic of the Indigenous nation in question, and they 
must be shown how to discern legal principles within Indigenous sources of 
law, such as stories, the natural world, or language.64
To summarize, the rationale for including Indigenous law as a 
mandatory component of legal education is that Indigenous laws should 
inform Canadian law, especially section 35 rights. And yet, despite the 
repeated emphasis on this principle, it has not yet been actualized. Both 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission65 and the Canadian Bar 
Association66 recognize that, in many instances, judges have failed to give 
effect to Indigenous law. Further, we can draw a connection between legal 
education and the work of judges. No one knows, as a law student, whether 
one will eventually become a judge called upon to apply Indigenous laws. 
Students who have no interest whatsoever in Indigenous issues and have no 
intention of practising in the area of Indigenous legal issues may one day 
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become judges. And as judges, they may be required to discern and apply 
Indigenous laws. Thus, students who have the least interest in Indigenous 
laws and have no intention of practising in the area of Indigenous legal 
issues need mandatory training in Indigenous law the most. 
3. Indigenous Pedagogy
What might a mandatory course on Indigenous law within a law faculty 
look like? The rationale underlying a mandatory Indigenous law course 
should shape the pedagogy and content of such a course. Two aspects of 
the rationale established above are especially relevant. The first is to teach 
future lawyers and judges how to treat Indigenous law seriously as law: 
how to discern the normative principles within sources of Indigenous law 
such as stories, land, and language, and also how to apply those normative 
principles to novel fact scenarios.67 A second purpose is to equip students 
with the tools to set aside their own ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic, 
and begin to grasp the Indigenous ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic 
that give rise to the Indigenous laws at issue. The following suggestions for 
achieving these goals are drawn from my experience teaching “Indigenous 
Legal Traditions”, which is a mandatory course for all first-year law students 
at the Bora Laskin Faculty of Law at Lakehead University.68 
3.1 Place-Based Learning
The content of my Indigenous Legal Traditions course includes Anishinaabe 
law and Métis law, given our location in Anishinaabe and Métis territory69 
67 See Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, “Indigenous Legal Traditions: Roots to 
Renaissance” in Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 225 at 244; Hadley Friedland & Val Napoleon, 
“Gathering the Threads: Developing a Methodology for Researching and Rebuilding 
Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2015-2016) 1:1 Lakehead LJ 16 at 17.
68 I am deeply indebted to Aaron Mills for many aspects of both the substance and 
the structure of my course. My course is in many respects patterned after a course taught by 
Mills at the Bora Laskin Faculty of Law in the winter 2015 semester, which I attended. For 
a discussion of Mills’ course and the importance of teaching the underlying constitutional 
order and epistemology, ontology and cosmology of an Indigenous people in a mandatory 
course, see Mills, supra note 60 at 872–82.
69 The claim that Thunder Bay, Ontario, is located within Métis territory is contentious. 
On the one hand, the Métis Nation of Ontario asserts that Thunder Bay is located within their 
traditional harvesting territories: “Traditional Harvesting Territories Map”, Métis Nation of 
Ontario, online: <www.metisnation.org/registry/harvesting/harvesting-map/>. Similarly, the 
Red Sky Métis Independent Nation asserts that Thunder Bay is located within the territory 
they traditionally and currently use: “Who is Red Sky Métis Independent Nation™?”, Red 
Sky Métis Independent Nation, online: <rsmin.ca/about-us>. On the other hand, some 
members of Fort William First Nation—the Anishinaabe nation whose traditional territory 
includes Thunder Bay—have critiqued the claim that Thunder Bay is within Métis territory: 
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Waaseyaa’sin Christine Sy et al, “‘Anishinaabe and Métis Territory?’: An Ice Breaker” 
(10 November 2016), NetNewsLedger, online: <www.netnewsledger.com/2016/11/10/
anishinaabe-metis-territory-ice-breaker/>.
70 T&RC, The Legacy, supra note 14 at 98–99; see e.g. Marie Battiste, Decolonizing 
Education: Nourishing the Learning Spirit (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2013) at 74 
[Battiste].
71 For example, local Elders as well as knowledge-holders and members of Fort 
William First Nation (located next to Thunder Bay) give talks in my course. I also bring the 
students to Fort William First Nation (see section 3.4, below, for further discussion). The Bora 
Laskin Faculty of Law has signed a Protocol Agreement with the four Indigenous nations 
most closely connected to the territory where we are located: the Anishinabek Nation (Union 
of Ontario Indians), Grand Council Treaty #3, Métis Nation of Ontario, and Nishnawbe Aski 
Nation. Pursuant to this agreement, our Faculty meets regularly with representatives of each 
of these four nations in order to discuss Indigenous issues within our Faculty.
72 For discussions of this issue, see Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: 
Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd ed (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2012); Shawn Wilson, 
Research is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2008). 
73 See the text accompanying note 17, above.
74 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th Anniversary ed (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) at 72 [Freire].
and given my identity as a citizen of the Métis Nation of Ontario and as 
a member of a Métis and Anishinaabe family. By focusing on the laws of 
the local Indigenous communities, I am adopting a place-based approach to 
learning, which is endorsed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and by Indigenous scholars.70 A place-based approach allows members of the 
Indigenous community whose laws are being studied to be directly involved 
in shaping and delivering the course material.71 This technique helps to 
lessen the risk of perpetuating a colonial approach that treats Indigenous 
peoples as subjects of study, as opposed to agents and knowledge-holders.72 
In other words, it can provide an opportunity for Indigenous peoples to 
exercise their right to self-determination.73
3.2 Epistemologies
An adequate account of an Anishinaabe ontology, epistemology, ethic, and 
logic is far beyond the scope of this paper. The most I will attempt here is to 
highlight some differences between western and Anishinaabe epistemologies 
for the sake of showing why and how western and Anishinaabe pedagogies 
differ.
Despite philosophical debates, the standard western conception of 
truth, the one accepted for practical purposes, is that truth is objective 
and absolute. True facts exist in the world independently of knowers. The 
scientific method is premised on this conception; by repeatedly refining 
our theories, we will draw closer to the truth. The corresponding pedagogy 
has been described by Paulo Freire as the banking system of education.74 
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Students, who lack knowledge, are empty vessels that can be filled with 
knowledge by passively receiving deposits of true facts from a teacher.75 
According to this epistemology, teachers are authorities who bestow 
knowledge by transferring true facts.76 Standard western teaching methods, 
such as the lecture, reflect these assumptions. A lecturer is an authority who 
occupies a privileged place in the classroom, usually at the front—elevated 
by standing while students are seated. The lecturer states true facts that 
students receive. Once students are able to accurately repeat, or perhaps 
apply, the true facts, then they too have knowledge. 
This can be contrasted with an Anishinaabe conception of knowledge 
and truth. Lana Ray and Paul Nicholas Cormier describe an Anishinaabe 
epistemology with the story, “Nanaboozhoo and the Maple Trees”:
A long time ago when the world was new, Gitche Manitou made things so that life 
was very easy for the people. There were plenty of animals, good weather, and the 
maple trees were filled with thick sweet syrup; they just had to break off a twig and 
collect it as it dropped off. Nanaboozhoo went to go see his friends the Anishinaabe, 
but when he arrived there was no one around—they were not fishing, working in 
the fields, or gathering berries. Nanaboozhoo finally found them in a grove of maple 
trees, lying on their backs with their mouths open, letting the maple syrup drip into 
their mouths. 
Upon seeing this, Nanaboozhoo said, “This will not do.” He went down to the river 
and took a big basket made of birch bark, bringing back many buckets of water. He 
went to the top of the maple trees and poured the water in so that it thinned out, 
making the syrup thin and watery and just barely sweet to the taste. “This is how it 
will be from now on”, he said. “No longer will syrup drip from the maple trees. Now 
there will be only watery sap. When people want to make maple syrup they will have 
to gather many buckets full of the sap in the birch bark baskets like mine. They will 
have to gather wood and make fires to heat the stones to drop into the baskets. They 
will have to boil the water with the heated stones for a long time to make even a little 
maple syrup.[”]77
Ray and Cormier explain that the thick maple syrup is akin to knowledge,78 
and that western teaching and learning methods, such as being spoon-fed 
facts from a PowerPoint slide, are akin to lying on the ground and letting 
75 Ibid. See also Battiste, supra note 70 at 106.
76 Freire, supra note 74 at 72.
77 Lana Ray & Paul Nicholas Cormier, “Killing the Weendigo with Maple Syrup: 
Anishinaabe Pedagogy and Post-Secondary Research” (2012) 35:1 Can J Native Education 
163 at 165 [Ray & Cormier], citing Michael J Caduto & Joseph Bruchac, Keepers of the Earth: 
Native American Stories and Environmental Activities for Children (Colorado: Fulcrum 
Publishing, 1989) at 145.
78 Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 165.
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maple syrup drip into one’s mouth.79 The process of turning the sap into 
syrup represents Anishinaabe knowledge.80 Just as it takes many people 
actively working together to gather bucket after bucket of sap, collect wood, 
make a fire, and boil the sap for hours simply to make a small amount of 
syrup, so too does learning require both sustained personal engagement—
or in other words, the active exercise of individual agency81—as well as 
working together within a community.82 
This Anishinaabe epistemology corresponds to an Anishinaabe 
conception of truth. Basil Johnston explains that the Anishinaabemowin 
phrase “w’daeb-awae” means “he or she is telling the truth, is correct, is 
right.”83 But the truth referred to in this phrase is not absolute; it is a qualified 
truth, one that is circumscribed by the speaker’s experience, perception, and 
command of language at that time.84 What one knows is a result of one’s 
own lived experience and active personal engagement, and so one is always 
bounded by the limits of that experience. This conception helps to explain 
why an elder will often say that she or he does not know much.85 Such 
statements are incongruous from within a western epistemology, according 
to which Anishinaabe elders are authorities on Anishinaabe traditions. 
But as Leanne Simpson explains, “you’ll always hear from our Elders what 
appears to be them ‘qualifying’ their teachings with statements that position 
them as learners, that position their ideas as their own understandings, and 
place their teachings within the context of their own lived experience.”86 
Anishinaabe elders do not purport to fill their listeners like empty vessels 
with absolute truth, or in other words, to pour thick maple syrup directly 
into our mouths.
79 Ibid at 166–67.
80 See Margaret Noori, “Beshaabiiag G’gikenmaaigowag: Comets of Knowledge” in 
Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam James Sinclair & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, eds, Centering 
Anishinaabeg Studies: Understanding the World through Stories (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2013) 35 (explaining that “there is no noun for ‘knowledge’ in the verb-
based Anishinaabe language. In place of a single target word or definition, there are instead 
verbs bound with prefixes and suffixes indicating what is known and who is knowing” at 35).
81 Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 165. 
82 Ibid at 170.
83 Basil H Johnston, “Is That All There Is? Tribal Literature” (Spring 1991) No. 128 
Can Literature 54 at 57 [Johnston].
84 Ibid. 
85 Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko (Windigo) Legal Principles: Responding to 
Harmful People in Cree, Anishinabek and Saulteaux Societies—Past, Present and Future Uses, 
with a Focus on Contemporary Violence and Child Victimization Concerns (LLM Thesis, 
University of Alberta, 2009) [unpublished] at 20, n 19 [Friedland, The Wetiko].
86 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, “Land as Pedagogy: Nishnaabeg Intelligence and 
Rebellious Transformation” (2014) 3:3 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 at 
11 [Simpson].
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These fundamental differences between a western epistemology and an 
Anishinaabe epistemology provide an answer to the question of whether 
Indigenous law should be taught in a stand-alone mandatory course as 
suggested by the wording of call to action #28, or whether it should be 
integrated throughout the law school curriculum.87 
In my view, this is a false dichotomy; we can pursue both options at the 
same time. Teaching Indigenous law only in a stand-alone course runs the 
risk of marginalizing both the content of such a course88 and those who 
teach it.89 As such, the project of integrating Indigenous law throughout a 
curriculum—especially throughout mandatory courses—has considerable 
value. Likewise, a mandatory stand-alone course in Indigenous law has 
at least as much value. It can provide the space and the time needed for 
identifying and isolating one’s own ontological, epistemological, ethical, and 
logical assumptions, and for learning how to work from within a different 
ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic, which is valuable for at least two 
reasons.
First, when the common law changes and develops to address society’s 
evolving needs, it does so as a result of courts identifying the policy rationales 
underlying the black letter rules, and applying those underlying rationales or 
values to the new context. If Indigenous laws are to be permitted to develop 
in the same way and to truly function as law, they cannot be divorced 
87 See Sutcliffe, supra note 6 (quoting “Daniel Justice, chair of the First Nations 
Indigenous Studies program at [the University of British Columbia]”, expressing the view that 
incorporating Indigenous content throughout a curriculum is preferable because otherwise 
some may feel that they have a “free pass” not to address Indigenous issues).
88 See Lorne Sossin, “The TRC Calls to Action & the pursuit of ‘Reconciliation’” (18 
October 2015), Dean Sossin’s Blog (blog), online: <deansblog.osgoode.yorku.ca/2015/10/the-
trc-calls-to-action-the-pursuit-of-reconciliation/>.
89 For an account of the personal and professional costs experienced by racialized 
professors, and specifically the backlash experienced by a law professor teaching social justice 
issues, see Rakhi Ruparelia, “Guilty Displeasures: White Resistance in the Social Justice 
Classroom” (2014) 37:2 Dalhousie LJ 815, especially section IV at 836–40. For an account of 
backlash from students experienced by a Cree professor when teaching a university course 
incorporating critical perspectives of Canadian and First Nations relations, see Priscilla 
Settee, Pimatisiwin: The Good Life, Global Indigenous Knowledge Systems (Vernon, BC: 
JCharlton Publishing, 2013) at 39 [Settee]. For an account of backlash from colleagues and 
administrators experienced by Indigenous professors attempting to introduce Indigenous 
content into their courses, see Frances Henry, “Indigenous Faculty at Canadian Universities: 
Their Stories” (2012) 44:2 Can Ethnic Studies 101 at 120–21 [Henry]. For an account of the 
backlash from non-Indigenous students experienced by Indigenous faculty, see Henry, ibid 
at 126–28.
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from their underlying rationales or values, or in other words, from their 
ontologies, epistemologies, ethics, and logics.90 
Second, the risk of integrating Indigenous law throughout the 
curriculum without a mandatory stand-alone course is that the Indigenous 
law may become divorced from its ontology, epistemology, ethic, and 
logic.91 This scenario would reproduce the obstacles encountered by 
Chief Justice McEachern and Justice Vickers. When Indigenous laws are 
treated as a mere laundry list of rules or principles, removed from their 
ontological, epistemological, ethical, and logical foundations, they can 
appear simplistic—lacking in normative force, “disconnected and bizarre” 
or “completely and hopelessly stuck in the past.”92 As a result, Indigenous 
laws can be misconstrued, especially when subjected to foreign analytical 
categories.93 For example, as Larry Chartrand recognizes, many Indigenous 
legal traditions do not compartmentalize their laws “into discrete subject 
matters like tort law or criminal law.”94 Although John Borrows allows for the 
possibility of organizing some Indigenous laws according to common law or 
civil law categories,95 he also argues that it is preferable to use the categories 
inherent to the tradition in question,96 and thus suggests organizing a 
course in Anishinaabe law according to the following categories: Heroes, 
90 I envision this two-pronged approach as an instance of what Damien Lee refers to 
as the “Balloon Approach to Decolonization”, according to which one simultaneously pushes 
back against colonialism (for example, by articulating the differences between western and 
Anishinaabe ontologies, epistemologies, ethics, and logics in a stand-alone course) and 
fills up the space created by the push-back with Indigenous legal orders (for example, by 
teaching Indigenous laws throughout the legal curriculum): Damien Lee, “Because Our Law 
is Our Law”: Considering Anishinaabe Citizenship Orders through Adoption Narratives at Fort 
William First Nation (PhD Thesis, University of Manitoba Department of Native Studies, 
2017) [unpublished] at 80–81.
91 See Mills, supra note 60 at 851, 857, 883. 
92 Val Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, 2009) [unpublished], cited in Hadley 
Friedland, “Reflective Frameworks: Methods for Accessing, Understanding and Applying 
Indigenous Laws” (2012) 11:1 Indigenous LJ 1 at 14.
93 See Eva Marie Garroutte & Kathleen Delores Westcott, “The Story Is a Living Being: 
Companionship with Stories in Anishinaabeg Studies” in Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam 
James Sinclair & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, eds, Centering Anishinaabeg Studies: 
Understanding the World through Stories (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2013) 61 at 61–62. 
94 Chartrand, supra note 12 at 22. Similarly, John Borrows explains that noun-
based categories in general are not the norm for nations whose language is verb-based, 
as Anishinaabemowin is: John Borrows, “Heroes, Tricksters, Monsters, and Caretakers: 
Indigenous Law and Legal Education” (2016) 61:4 McGill LJ 795 at 808 [Borrows, “Heroes”].
95 Borrows, “Heroes”, supra note 94 at 813.
96 Ibid at 814–15.
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Tricksters, Monsters, and Caretakers.97 Of course, Indigenous ontologies, 
epistemologies, ethics, and logics could potentially be taught in a torts 
law or criminal law course, for example. But given that these ontologies, 
epistemologies, ethics, and logics underlie all aspects of Indigenous law, 
and given the substantial attention they merit so as to avoid painting a 
simplistic picture of an Indigenous worldview, a stand-alone course may be 
worthwhile. 
3.3 Pedagogies
The fundamental differences between a western epistemology and 
an Anishinaabe epistemology also illustrate the reason for employing 
Anishinaabe pedagogies when teaching Anishinaabe laws.98 As Rauna 
Kuokkanen notes, attempting to understand Indigenous traditions through 
a western epistemology or pedagogy “yields only epistemic violence and 
biased, stereotypical (mis)interpretations.”99 Two of the principles that 
emerged from the story of “Nanaboozhoo and the Maple Trees” were the 
importance of learning through active personal engagement and learning 
collectively.100 I aim to implement these principles in my Indigenous Legal 
Traditions course in the following ways.
I use lectures sparingly—usually only when discussing history—given 
the western epistemological assumptions implicit within the lecture format, 
namely that the lecturer is an authority, that knowledge can be transmitted 
by simply communicating true facts, and that students are empty vessels to 
be filled up.101 Instead, my classes are most often structured around talking 
circles.102 There are thirty students in each section of the course. We usually 
have two talking circles per class. First, a group of approximately eight to 
fifteen students discusses a handful of Anishinaabe stories in a talking circle, 
while the other students serve as witnesses to the circle. Then the groups 
switch, and approximately eight to fifteen of those who were witnesses 
97 Ibid at 801, 820–27.
98 Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 165–66, 172.
99 Kuokkanen, supra note 6; see also Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 173.
100 For further discussion of the significance of collective learning within community 
embeddedness, see Friedland, The Wetiko, supra note 85 at 130–32; Doris Pratt et al, 
Untuwe Pi Kin He—Who We Are: Treaty Elders’ Teachings, vol 1 (Winnipeg: Treaty Relations 
Commission of Manitoba, 2014) at 101 (quoting Anishinaabe Elder Enil Keeper) [Pratt et al]; 
Simpson, supra note 86 at 7.
101 See Settee, supra note 89 at 36 (describing Maria Campbell’s 2003 keynote address 
in which Campbell explained that each of these features of the lecture format are “not 
conducive to [learning] Indigenous [k]nowledge”).
102 As mentioned above at note 68, I am indebted to Mills for many aspects of the 
structure of my course, including the talking circle format that I employ. 
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discuss a handful of different stories in a circle and the others take their turn 
as witnesses. 
Both the use of stories and the circle format promote students’ active 
learning and personal engagement. Anishinaabe stories reflect Anishinaabe 
law.103 But unlike expository writing, stories rarely contain a positivistic 
statement of legal principles. Instead, principles are often implicit within the 
action of the story and listeners (or readers)104 are responsible for finding 
the principles and using them to generate meaning within their own lives.105 
The circle format also promotes active engagement and learning.106 No one 
is in a privileged position, at the front of the room, raised above others. I 
sit in the circle with the students; we are all on the same level, in the same 
position.107 As the stick makes its way around the circle, each person has 
as much or as little time as he or she needs to draw out principles from 
the stories. Given that I am only one voice in the circle, students cannot 
passively rely solely on my thoughts. That being said, I do modify the circle 
format for the classroom: once the stick has gone around once, we put it 
down and open up the circle for discussion. This provides an opportunity 
for synthesis—to answer questions that came up during the circle and for 
students to ask further questions. The open discussion, though, does not 
eclipse the circle portion in either time or importance.108 
103 See Pratt et al, supra note 100 (“Laws in First Nations lands were passed down from 
the Elders to the younger generations through their stories, language, and sacred teachings” 
at 27); Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 22 at 57; Napoleon & Friedland, “Inside 
Job”, supra note 26 at 738 (“Our starting place is that some Indigenous stories embed law, 
legal principles, and legal processes. Stories can be or contain a deliberate form of precedent 
or shared memory”); on the role of Anishinaabe stories in teaching Anishinaabe laws to 
children, see Thomas Peacock, “Teaching as Story” in Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam James 
Sinclair & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, eds, Centering Anishinaabeg Studies: Understanding 
the World through Stories (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013) 103; for an 
account of the power of Anishinaabe stories to reclaim Anishinaabe laws from the laws 
excreted by Canadian courts, see John Borrows, “Maajitaadaa: Nanaboozhoo and the Flood, 
Part 2” in Jill Doerfler, Niigaanwewidam James Sinclair & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, 
eds, Centering Anishinaabeg Studies: Understanding the World through Stories (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2013) ix.
104 Anishinaabe stories are often told orally, but some stories have also been recorded 
in writing: see Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 22 at 56. 
105 See Simpson, supra note 86 at 8.
106 See Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 169.
107 See Pratt et al, supra note 100 (quoting Anishinaabe Elder Ken Courchene: “The 
seventh law, look at how we sat in a circle. All differently. We got to sit in this way. Everyone 
is different and yet equal. And we always had that belief, that difference is not to segregate 
someone as higher or lower” at 31). 
108 As mentioned above at note 68, I am indebted to Mills for this talking circle 
format.
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The talking circle and the protocols we use in the circle also promote 
collective learning. Students are encouraged to build upon what others say 
in the circle. They can do this by incorporating the discussion of others into 
their own discussion while adding further thoughts. They can also offer 
answers to questions raised in the circle. In addition, those who want to 
disagree with something that has been said in the circle are encouraged to 
do so indirectly to avoid directly contradicting each other. 
The second rationale, identified above, for making Indigenous law 
mandatory is the need to teach future lawyers and judges how to treat 
Indigenous law as law; or in other words, how to comprehend Indigenous 
stories as containing not merely factual information but also normative 
principles that are useful in solving legal problems. The modes of evaluation 
within my Indigenous Legal Traditions course are structured to accomplish 
this goal. The two main modes of evaluation are a talking circle assignment 
and a final exam. Both are designed to let students practice applying the 
law in the same way that students practice applying the common law, 
namely, through the use of hypothetical fact scenarios. The talking circle 
assignment is essentially an in-class, group-based, oral exam. A group of 
fifteen students is assigned to complete the talking circle assignment during 
a specific class. At the beginning of that class, those students are given a fact 
scenario describing an Anishinaabe community dealing with a number of 
interrelated legal problems. The students are required to analyze the scenario 
using Anishinaabe law, not Canadian law. They must do so as a group, using 
the talking circle protocols that we employed during class when discussing 
stories. The final exam is also a hypothetical fact scenario where students are 
required to apply either Anishinaabe or Métis law, not Canadian law, but it is 
in the format of a conventional law school exam—each students writes out 
his or her own answer individually. 
3.4 Room for Improvement
Although the foregoing description illustrates, I hope, some potential 
means of implementing Anishinaabe pedagogies into a law program, I also 
acknowledge the many shortcomings of my course. One pertains to language. 
The Anishinaabe language, Anishinaabemowin, reflects Anishinaabe law.109 
Anishinaabe Elder Harry Bone (Giizis-Inini) explains: “That is what the 
Elders said long ago. If someday you cannot speak the Anishinaabe language, 
then you will lose your Anishinaabe way of thinking.”110 My proficiency in 
Anishinaabemowin is insufficient, at this time, to properly teach the ways in 
109 See Johnston, supra note 83 at 55–56.
110 Pratt et al, supra note 100 (“Our languages are sacred gifts, given to us by the 
Creator. They carry our way of life, our views of the world, our history, our laws and they 
bind us to each other” at 69).
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which it embodies Anishinaabe law. Thus, a satisfactory analysis of this topic 
is beyond the scope of this paper as such an analysis is beyond my abilities 
at this time. The best I can do is highlight Basil Johnston’s “One Generation 
from Extinction”, where Johnston explains that within Anishinaabemowin, 
“the wolf, the bear and the caribou” are our elder brothers, not beasts, objects, 
or resources.111 In other words, animals are our relations, and as such, we 
have an obligation to fulfill certain responsibilities to them. Animals are not 
chattels or potential chattels. In this way, Anishinaabemowin reflects certain 
Anishinaabe ontological principles, which in turn give rise to normative 
principles, or in other words, laws. One of my goals going forward is to 
rectify my shortcoming in this regard by learning Anishinaabemowin.
Another shortcoming of my course is that it is not sufficiently land-
based.112 Land, including rocks, plants, trees, animals, and water, is a 
significant source of Anishinaabe law.113 As Anishinaabe Elder Francis 
Nepinak (Giiwedinanang) explains: “That is where the Anishinaabe person 
gets his knowledge, from the environment; this is what it is called in English—
‘education,’ ‘school.’ The earth, Mother Earth, has been teaching. The Creator 
gave her what to teach us.”114 John Borrows uses the Anishinaabemowin 
term aki-noomaagewin,115 or the English phrase “natural law”, to describe 
this phenomenon,116 but is quick to distinguish natural law in this sense 
from western natural law theories,117 according to which some necessary 
111 Basil H Johnston, “One Generation from Extinction” in WH New, ed, Native 
Writers and Canadian Writing (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) 10 at 10.
112 For a discussion of the importance of land-based pedagogy when teaching 
Indigenous law, as well as an account of such initiatives in Canadian law schools, see John 
Borrows, “Outsider Education: Indigenous Law and Land-Based Learning” (2016) 33:1 
Windsor YB Access Just 1 [Borrows, “Outsider Education”]. See also Hannah Askew, 
“Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Challenge of Intercultural Legal Education in Canadian 
Law Schools” (2014) [unpublished] at 16–20, online: <www.oba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/
cba_on/pdf/Foundation/StudiesFellowshipHannaAskew.pdf>.
113 See Ray & Cormier, supra note 77 at 172; Hannah Askew, “Accessing Justice 
and Reconciliation: Anishinabek Legal Summary” at 35, 38, online: <indigenousbar.ca/
indigenouslaw/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/anishinabek_summary.pdf>. For an example 
of how to derive principles regarding research methodologies by drawing analogies 
from engagement with the land, specifically berry picking, see Kathleen E Absolon 
(Minogiizhigokwe), Kaandossiwin: How We Come to Know (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 
2011) at 25–26.
114 D’Arcy Linklater et al, Ka’esi Wahkotumahk Aski—Our Relations With The Land: 
Treaty Elders’ Teachings, vol 2 (Winnipeg: Treaty Relations Commission of Manitoba, 2014) 
at 23–24 [Linklater et al].
115 See Dalhousie University, “‘Aki-noomaagewin (Earth’s Teachings): Stories of the 
Fall, Indigenous Law and Reconciliation’ – Dr. John Borrows” (2014), online: Vimeo <vimeo.
com/88384840>.
116 Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 22 at 28.
117 Ibid at 29.
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [Vol. 9532
connection exists between law and morality.118 The natural law described by 
Borrows involves observing the natural world, such as the actions of plants 
and animals, and reasoning by analogy to draw legal principles from those 
observations.119 Ray and Cormier’s interpretation of “Nanaboozhoo and 
the Maple Trees” illustrates a natural law approach. They draw an analogy 
between the process of making maple syrup and the process of acquiring 
knowledge, and then derive principles from that analogy about the nature 
of knowledge. I strive to incorporate land-based learning into my course 
by bringing my students to the sugar bush at Fort William First Nation, 
which is located beside Thunder Bay.120 Instead of simply reading about the 
normative principles that can be derived from maple trees, students have 
the opportunity to engage directly with the land and to learn from members 
of Fort William First Nation about how they understand and uphold their 
responsibilities to the maple trees at the sugar bush.121
While I believe this opportunity has immense value for our law students, 
I recognize that it also falls far short of the ideal described by Leanne 
Simpson in “Land as Pedagogy: Nishnaabeg Intelligence and Rebellious 
Transformation”.122 Simpson eschews attempts to indigenize the academy 
that try to incorporate Nishnaabeg intelligence into the existing structure of 
western universities, which rests on “coercion and authority.”123 Instead, she 
advocates for a truly Nishnaabeg conception of learning, free from settler-
colonial institutions and premised on fostering intimate relationships 
with all elements of creation.124 As Simpson puts it, “we shouldn’t be just 
striving for land-based pedagogies. The land must once again become the 
pedagogy.”125 
I acknowledge that one visit to the sugar bush, even combined with the 
use of talking circles in the classroom, comes nowhere close to actualizing 
the kind of Nishnaabeg learning that Simpson describes. Throughout 
118 See Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal 
Theory, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 10.
119 Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 22 at 28. See also Linklater et al, 
supra note 114 (“The stories … show us how revered and sacred plants and animals are to 
our Nations. … By observing them, we learn good behaviours. They show us the natural laws 
we are to live by” at 39).
120 For an account of this initiative, see Borrows, “Outsider Education”, supra note 112 
at 15–16.
121 See Damien Lee & Stephanie MacLaurin, “Maple Syrup and Anishinaabe 
Governance in a (Climate) Changing World”, The Walleye (4 April 2016), online: <www.
thewalleye.ca>.
122 Simpson, supra note 86.
123 Ibid at 7.
124 Ibid at 9–10.
125 Ibid at 14 [emphasis in original].
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the course, I strive to instill in students a sense of humility about their 
relationship with Anishinaabe law, and my hope is that their experience will 
encourage them to continue to pursue, even after completing their formal 
western education, the type of community-embedded, self-led learning for 
which Simpson advocates.126
4. Academic Freedom
Another potential hurdle in the way of mandatory Indigenous content is 
the claim that such a requirement would violate academic freedom. This 
section evaluates this claim and argues that it rests on a mischaracterization 
of academic freedom. 
At the heart of the academic freedom complaint is the claim that 
certain universities have become beholden to a political agenda, and that 
this agenda is the driving force behind the push for required Indigenous 
content.127 Brent Venton, for example, argues that the motivation for 
mandatory Indigenous courses is the indoctrination of university students 
into a particular viewpoint.128 He describes universities as being concerned 
that society has the “wrong” opinion on Indigenous issues, and as trying 
to “correct” this opinion with an Indigenous content requirement.129 His 
conclusion is that mandatory Indigenous content “undermines academic 
freedom.”130
Venton’s critique presumes that universities who adopt mandatory 
Indigenous content requirements are prescribing certain doctrines, views, 
or opinions. I submit that this presumption, at least with respect to legal 
education, is unfounded. Teaching Anishinaabe law and Métis law is not a 
matter of convincing students to espouse any particular viewpoint. Rather, 
the goal is to teach content and skills to students. As discussed earlier 
in Section 2, lawyers and judges in Canada need to know the content of 
Indigenous laws so that they can properly interpret and apply section 35 
rights. Section 2 also illustrated the problems judges (and lawyers) encounter 
when they have not received training regarding Indigenous ontology and 
epistemology, and hence do not have the skills to identify and then apply 
Indigenous legal principles.
This prompts the question of whether prescribing particular content 
and skills, as opposed to viewpoints, violates academic freedom. If so, 
126 Ibid at 7.
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advocates for mandatory Indigenous content face a serious problem because 
academic freedom, as Michiel Horn puts it, is widely regarded as being a 
Good Thing.131 The defence of academic freedom within academia is 
so ardent that the concept is considered to be almost sacred.132 Given its 
clout, it may be tempting to try to stretch the concept to include ever more 
facets of academic life under its aegis. And yet, academic freedom is not 
unlimited.133 To answer this question, then, it is necessary to examine the 
concept of academic freedom.
Michiel Horn explains that academic freedom generally has two 
meanings: “the freedom of universities from external control, and the 
freedom of teachers and researchers to do their work.”134 The former 
refers to the autonomy of universities qua institutions, and the latter refers 
to the autonomy of individual professors to pursue truth regardless of the 
unpopularity of their conclusions. It is not clear which meaning critics such 
as Venton have in mind, and so the next two sections consider each in turn.
4.1 University Autonomy 
Academic freedom in the sense of university autonomy can be further 
subdivided into concerns with universities’ independence from the influence 
of governments or other funding institutions on the one hand, and political 
neutrality on the other. The former was at issue in McKinney v University of 
Guelph, where a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that in the 
context of that case, the universities at issue were not part of government 
131 Michiel Horn, Academic Freedom in Canada: A History (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999) at 6 [Horn]; see also McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 
at para 69, 76 DLR (4th) 545 [McKinney].
132 See Cannie Stark, “Academic Freedom, “Political Correctness”, and Ethics” (1997) 
38:4 Can Psychology 232 at 232 [Stark].
133 Ibid at 232 (explaining that academic freedom “does not mean that we can do 
whatever we want and say whatever we want and write whatever we want whenever we want”)
[emphasis in original]. 
134 Horn, supra note 131 at 4. See also Charles T Gillin, “The Bog-like Ground on 
Which We Tread: Arbitrating Academic Freedom in Canada” (2002) 39:3 Can Rev Sociology 
& Anthropology 301 at 304 (explaining that “academic freedom may be about the protection 
of individual rights and/or institutional independence”) [Gillin]; Universities Canada, 
“Statement on Academic Freedom” (25 October 2011), Universities Canada, online: <www.
univcan.ca/media-room/media-releases/statement-on-academic-freedom/> (stating that 
academic freedom is based on “institutional autonomy”) [Universities Canada]. Contra 
Canadian Association of University Teachers, “Academic Freedom” (approved by CAUT 
Council, November 2011), CAUT / ACPPU, s 6, online: <www.caut.ca/about-us/caut-
policy/lists/caut-policy-statements/policy-statement-on-academic-freedom> (drawing a 
sharp distinction between academic freedom and institutional autonomy and denying that 
institutional autonomy is an element of academic freedom) [CAUT, “Academic Freedom”].
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for the purposes of section 32 of the Charter.135 One of the reasons relied 
on by the majority in support of this conclusion was the academic freedom 
of universities, understood as the entitlement of universities to be free from 
government influence.136
Government control, however, is not the issue in the present debate. 
Critics are not suggesting that governments are forcing or even persuading 
universities to adopt an Indigenous content requirement. Rather, by 
complaining that universities are being influenced by “social and political” 
concerns, Venton is appealing to the second sense of university autonomy, 
namely, the notion that academic institutions must be politically neutral. 
According to the traditional view, institutional neutrality is a condition 
precedent for the exercise of academic freedom by individual professors.137 
This raises the question: Does institutional neutrality mean that universities 
must be free of all social and political influences, as Venton implies? 
Venton’s claim that such influence is unacceptable suggests that at 
least some universities are able to avoid it, presumably those which do not 
have an Indigenous content requirement. The assumption, then, is that at 
least some universities are neutral, unbiased, and impartial insofar as they 
are not beholden to a social and political agenda. But of course, content 
requirements still exist within these universities: to graduate with any 
given degree, a student must successfully complete the required courses 
for that degree. The difference is merely that the content of these required 
courses is non-Indigenous. The implication is that non-Indigenous content 
requirements are neutral, unbiased, and impartial, while Indigenous content 
requirements are the result of pandering to social and political agendas. 
The problem with this line of thought is that non-Indigenous content 
requirements are not neutral; they reflect a privileging of non-Indigenous 
worldviews, non-Indigenous epistemologies, non-Indigenous ontologies, 
and non-Indigenous normative principles. To paraphrase Thomas Nagel, 
there is no view from nowhere.138 The choice of any given content is a 
privileging of that content over whatever is excluded. For this reason, 
academic freedom in the sense of institutional neutrality cannot mean that 
universities must be free from all social and political influences. Such a state 
of affairs is impossible. Every program that a university approves, every 
135 McKinney, supra note 131 at para 45.
136 Ibid at para 42.
137 See J Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: 
An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education” (1993) 43:3 J Leg Educ 315 
at 316, 318 [Byrne]; David M Rabban, “Does Professional Education Constrain Academic 
Freedom?” (1993) 43:3 J Leg Educ 358 at 358–59 [Rabban].
138 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986).
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degree that a university decides to offer, and essentially every substantive 
decision that a university makes, reflects some social and political value. 
Institutional neutrality merely means that a university’s administration 
cannot endorse social and political views in a way that impedes the academic 
freedom of individual professors.139 To determine whether Indigenous 
content requirements cross this line, it is necessary to consider academic 
freedom in the second sense, namely, the autonomy of individual professors 
to pursue truth free of institutional interference. 
4.2 Freedom to Pursue Truth
Discussions of academic freedom most often focus on the concept’s second 
meaning: the freedom of professors to determine their research agenda and 
articulate the findings of their research free from the threat of reprisal. No 
definition of academic freedom in this second sense has gained universal, or 
even Canada-wide, acceptance.140 Horn provides the most comprehensive 
history of academic freedom in Canada.141 Barry Hogan and Lane Trotter 
summarize Horn’s description into five elements:
(a) the freedom to pursue truth wherever that may lead, (b) tenure so that the truth-
seeker is not subject to loss of job when the research is controversial, (c) the ability of 
the scholar to be critical of the university, (d) the ability of the scholar to participate 
in public life, and (e) co-governance within the university.142
The model clause approved in 1977 by the Canadian Association of University 
Teachers (“CAUT”) has also enjoyed a certain measure of approval.143 In 
1990, Donald Savage described it as “the most authoritative statement in 
Canada on the subject of academic freedom”144 and it was applied in at least 
139 Cf Byrne, supra note 137 (explaining that complaints about political correctness 
refer to “administrative sponsorship of certain social ideals in a manner that restricts criticism 
or debate” at 316).
140 See Re University of Manitoba, 21 CLAS 438, [1991] MGAD No 19 (QL) (grievance 
arbitration) (“The phrase ‘academic freedom’ means different things to different people” at 
para 31) [Manitoba]; University of Calgary Faculty Assn v University of Calgary, 60 CLAS 13, 
[1999] AGAA No 104 (QL) (grievance arbitration) (“Academic freedom is not a term with a 
precise definition” at para 8) [University of Calgary].
141 Horn, supra note 131.
142 Barry E Hogan & Lane D Trotter, “Academic Freedom in Canadian Higher 
Education: Universities, Colleges, and Institutes were Not Created Equal” (2013) 43:2 Can J 
Higher Education 68 at 70 [Hogan & Trotter].
143 But see Manitoba, supra note 140 (identifying deficiencies in the CAUT model 
clause at para 92). 
144 Ibid at para 43; but see critique of Savage’s view of the limits of academic freedom 
as being too narrow (ibid at para 92).
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one arbitration decision.145 In 2011, however, CAUT adopted an updated 
policy on academic freedom, which differs in some important respects from 
the 1977 model clause.146 The 2011 policy is too long to quote in its entirety 
here, but the key passage states:
Academic freedom includes the right, without restriction by prescribed doctrine, 
to freedom to teach and discuss; freedom to carry out research and disseminate 
and publish the results thereof; freedom to produce and perform creative works; 
freedom to engage in service to the institution and the community; freedom to 
express one’s opinion about the institution, its administration, and the system in 
which one works; freedom to acquire, preserve, and provide access to documentary 
material in all formats; and freedom to participate in professional and representative 
academic bodies.  Academic freedom always entails freedom from institutional 
censorship.147
Universities Canada, an organization that advocates for Canadian 
universities, has issued its own “Statement on Academic Freedom” that 
puts greater emphasis on the limitations of academic freedom as opposed 
to its substantive content.148 The differences between the CAUT statement 
and that of Universities Canada are not surprising, given the different 
145 In the Matter of the University of British Columbia and Dr Julius Kane, unreported, 
Innis Christie, March 23, 1983 [Kane], cited in Manitoba, supra note 140 at para 43. But 
see Manitoba, ibid at para 92 (holding that the decision in Kane does not establish “that the 
CAUT statement is an all encompassing description of academic freedom”).
146 One key difference is that the 2011 policy draws a sharp distinction between 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and denies that institutional autonomy 
is an element of academic freedom: CAUT “Academic Freedom”, supra note 134, s 6. This 
distinction and denial does not appear in the 1977 model clause, which states:
The common good of society depends upon the search for knowledge and its 
free exposition. Academic freedom in universities is essential to both these 
purposes in the teaching function of the university as well as in its scholarship 
and research. Academic staff shall not be hindered or impeded in any way by the 
university or the faculty association from exercising their legal rights as citizens, 
nor shall they suffer any penalties because of the exercise of such legal rights. The 
parties agree that they will not infringe or abridge the academic freedom of any 
member of the academic community. Academic members of the community are 
entitled, regardless of prescribed doctrine, to freedom in carrying out research 
and in publishing the results thereof, freedom of teaching and of discussion, 
freedom to criticize the university and the faculty association, and freedom 
from institutional censorship. Academic freedom does not require neutrality 
on the part of the individual. Rather, academic freedom makes commitment 
possible. Academic freedom carries with it the duty to use that freedom in a 
manner consistent with the scholarly obligation to base research and teaching 
on an honest search for knowledge (Cited in Manitoba, supra note 140 at para 42).
147 CAUT, “Academic Freedom”, supra note 134, s 2.
148 Universities Canada, supra note 134.
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constituencies these organizations represent: faculty associations and 
universities respectively. 
In the light of this lack of unanimity, a lawyer’s natural inclination is to 
look to courts and tribunals, whose definitions normally possess a degree of 
authority. However, the concept of academic freedom may be an exception 
to this rule. J Peter Byrne, writing about the legal application of academic 
freedom to law schools, states: “Legal regulation lies lightly upon law 
schools.”149 Charles Gillin argues that the meaning of academic freedom is 
not consistent across Canadian arbitration decisions.150 As he puts it, “[t]he 
arbitral grounding of academic freedom is soft and shifting—bog-like.”151 
One reason cited by Gillin for this phenomenon is the role of arbitrators as 
private adjudicators who have an incentive to issue “balanced” decisions or 
risk jeopardizing their career prospects, given that both the administration 
and the union must agree to hire any given arbitrator.152 The incentive to 
give some benefit to each party can result in different arbitrators applying 
the concept in different and, according to Gillin, muddled ways.153 Another 
explanation may be that arbitrators are bound to interpret and apply the 
collective agreement at issue, and different collective agreements define 
academic freedom differently.154 Perhaps more importantly, grievances 
rarely turn on a collective agreement’s academic freedom provision alone.155 
When other provisions are engaged, their application can be conflated with 
the notion of academic freedom.156
149 Byrne, supra note 137 at 316.
150 Gillin, supra note 134 at 319.
151 Ibid at 319.
152 Ibid at 316.
153 Ibid at 316, 317.
154 See Manitoba, supra note 140 (recognizing that the history of academic freedom 
“in Canada is one largely of contract as a mutual expression of understanding and agreement 
by faculty and university” at para 31).
155 Gillin may be alluding to this point when he states that arbitration decisions that 
employ “a ‘legalistic’ approach” fail to provide an insightful analysis of academic freedom: 
Gillin, supra note 134 at 317.
156 See e.g. Memorial University of Newfoundland v Memorial University of 
Newfoundland Faculty Association, 2007 CanLII 13499 (grievance arbitration) (where the 
university administration changed some students’ final grades without the instructor’s 
knowledge or input: at 14, 56). The arbitration panel concluded that the university was 
entitled to change the grades and that the professor did not have the “final say”, based on 
the university’s regulations (ibid at 55). However, the panel held that the university violated 
the professor’s academic freedom by not consulting her about the change in the grades, as 
required by principles of procedural fairness and due process (ibid at 55, 56). The panel held 
that academic freedom includes such procedural rights. However, it is not clear whether 
the panel would have reached the same conclusion on the basis of the concept of academic 
freedom alone, if not for the management rights clause in the collective agreement, which 
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Despite the lack of consensus, it is possible to identify some core elements 
within the concept of academic freedom, such as those features that are 
consistent across the various definitions, as well as the purpose underlying 
the concept. With respect to the first of these, it is uncontroversial that the 
protections afforded by academic freedom apply not only to research, but 
also to teaching.157 This raises the question: Does a requirement to teach 
Indigenous content violate the academic freedom of course instructors? In 
other words, does the application of academic freedom to teaching mean 
that instructors have free reign over what they teach such that they are 
entitled to refuse to teach Indigenous content, if they so choose?
To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the second core 
element of academic freedom, namely, the purpose underlying the concept. 
Taking a purposive approach to the concept of academic freedom is 
warranted because, as David Barnhizer explains, “[a]cademic freedom is 
not an end in itself; it exists only so that higher ends may be achieved.”158 
What, then, is the higher end or purpose of academic freedom? It is to 
facilitate the search for truth.159 If truth is to be identified, those who search 
for it cannot be constrained by prescribed dogma. They must be permitted 
to conduct their search without fear of reprisal in case it turns out that 
the truth is unpopular.160 Tenure is a necessary concomitant to academic 
freedom because it protects faculty from discipline for reaching unorthodox 
imposed a procedural duty on the university to exercise its governance functions in a “fair, 
equitable and reasonable manner” (ibid at 41, 42).
157 See CAUT, “Academic Freedom”, supra note 134, s 2; Universities Canada, supra 
note 134. Although the summary of Horn’s account provided by Hogan & Trotter does not 
explicitly refer to teaching, Horn clearly recognizes that teaching is covered by academic 
freedom: see Horn, supra note 131 at 4, 6. See also Keith S Dobson, “The Other Side of 
Academic Freedom is Academic Responsibility” 38:4 Can Psychology 244 (acknowledging 
that much of “the debate about limits to academic freedom actually deal more with the 
classroom and curriculum—and what is legitimate and not in that context—than research, 
per se” at 245).
158 David Barnhizer, “Freedom to Do What? Institutional Neutrality, Academic 
Freedom, and Academic Responsibility” (1993) 43:3 J Leg Educ 346 at 348, 349 [Barnhizer].
159 See Sidney Hook, “The Principles and Problems of Academic Freedom” (1986) 
58:1 Contemporary Education 6 (“why should the community which … underwrites the 
great costs of university education support the institution of academic freedom? … It believes 
that the discovery of new truths and the extension of the frontiers of knowledge are more 
effectively furthered by the presence of academic freedom than by its absence” at 8) [Hook]. 
See Dobson, supra note 157 (noting that some have “argued that academic freedom has been 
the major vehicle for advancing knowledge” at 244).
160 See Hook, supra note 159 (“the professionally qualified person in pursuit of the 
truth, and abiding by the Canons of professional ethics … [has] the right to heresy in the field 
of his competence” at 7).
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conclusions.161 On the traditional view, academic freedom requires political 
neutrality not only on the part of the institution, but also on the part of 
individual professors, whose inquiries must be disinterested so as to avoid 
distortion in their search for truth.162 Underlying this view is the claim that 
the scientific model serves as the basis for academic scholarship.163 In the 
legal context, however, this assumption is unfounded. No one methodology, 
not even the supposedly scientific Langdellian method,164 enjoys universal 
acceptance within legal scholarship,165 and the various methodologies 
employed—legal positivism, natural law theory, law and economics, critical 
legal studies—often presuppose certain political values.166 Regardless of 
which methodology is employed, the typical project of most legal scholarship 
is to identify shortcomings in the law and advocate for change. Such a 
project is inherently normative insofar as the selection of both shortcomings 
and alterations is underpinned by social and political values.167 Accordingly, 
social and political neutrality is not the ideal in legal scholarship.168 It is 
questionable whether neutrality is still the ideal in any other discipline, 
given CAUT’s rejection of it, as articulated in its 2011 policy statement, 
which provides: “Academic freedom does not require neutrality on the part 
of the individual. Academic freedom makes intellectual discourse, critique, 
and commitment possible.”169 The purpose underlying academic freedom 
in the legal context, then, is to protect faculty from being forced to espouse 
a position they do not endorse, and to ensure they are not prevented from 
espousing a position they do endorse, but political neutrality on the part of 
the individual is not a prerequisite to academic freedom.
A purposive analysis reveals that an Indigenous content requirement 
does not violate academic freedom. Such a requirement prescribes the 
161 See McKinney, supra note 131 (“Tenure provides the necessary academic freedom 
to allow free and fearless search for knowledge and the propagation of ideas” at para 62); 
Hogan & Trotter, supra note 142 at 70; Gillin, supra note 134 at 302.
162 See Byrne, supra note 137 at 318; Rabban, supra note 137 at 359.
163 See Byrne, supra note 137 at 327.
164 See Barnhizer, supra note 158 (explaining that the approach of legal scholars in 
the Langdellian era, who believed “law to be a science, value-neutral and apolitical”, and 
questioning the characterization of the Langdellian approach as scientific at 353, 348).
165 See Byrne, supra note 137 (arguing that as legal scholars, “we lack essential 
methodologies around which we can build consensus about what constitutes outstanding 
legal scholarship” at 320, 328).
166 Ibid at 321.
167 Ibid at 320.
168 See Barnhizer, supra note 158 (explaining that in the context of legal scholarship, 
“political and institutional neutrality is a mirage. We cannot do it” at 356); Bakht et al, supra 
note 8 (“The view that law is objective and neutral has long been the subject of devastating 
critique and today finds almost no serious scholarly support” at 683–84 [footnotes omitted]).
169 CAUT, “Academic Freedom”, supra note 134, s 3. See also Gillin, supra note 134 at 
303.
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subject matter of a course, not any particular position the instructor must 
take on the subject. Academic freedom, though, prohibits prescribing 
positions, not the subject to be taught. Being assigned to teach a certain 
subject does not prohibit a professor from articulating the findings of his or 
her research or require a professor to espouse positions that she or he does 
not endorse. Compelling reasons may exist for not assigning some courses 
to some professors, including lack of expertise or the need to balance 
teaching load, but these reasons appeal to principles of quality and fairness, 
not academic freedom.170 As scholars have consistently recognized, being 
assigned to teach any given course—whether it is family law or Indigenous 
law—is a legitimate limitation of one’s academic freedom, not a violation of 
it.171
Nothing about the underlying purpose of academic freedom allows 
faculty members to dictate the courses they teach, as opposed to the positions 
they take when teaching those courses. For example, when an instructor is 
assigned to teach property law, academic freedom does not entitle him or 
her to teach criminal law instead. And when an instructor is assigned to 
teach property law and the properly approved course description establishes 
170 Admittedly, a course assignment could potentially be allocated in such a way that 
it constitutes a violation of academic freedom, for example, if a faculty member is assigned 
to teach a course for which he or she lacks expertise as a punishment for articulating or 
not articulating particular views: see Re Vandervort, [2003] SLRBD No 14 (QL) at para 238 
(holding that “‘there are ways that a university could bring pressure on a professor to alter 
his views short of discipline; for example, by assignment of duties’”). The key, though, is 
the element of retribution against a faculty member for taking some action protected by 
academic freedom; without this element, such a teaching assignment may be unfair or 
injudicious, but it is not a violation of academic freedom. This is illustrated by the decision in 
University of Calgary, supra note 140. A dean withheld desirable teaching assignments from 
faculty members who had refused to include an essay as a mode of evaluation in their other 
courses. The panel held that based on the specific provisions of the collective agreement and 
the university’s particular governance structure, the dean’s attempt to implement the essay 
requirement was not a clear breach of academic freedom, although it did fall within a “grey 
area”: at para 370. Thus, the dean’s withholding of the desirable courses amounted to a breach 
of the harassment provision in the collective agreement, but not necessarily a breach of the 
academic freedom provision: at paras 372–73.
171 See A Malloch, “Academic Freedom and Its Limits”, in Michiel Horn, ed, 
Proceedings, Academic Freedom Conference Harry Crowe Memorial Lecture Series 1986 
(Toronto: York University, 1987) 6 at 10–11 [Malloch], quoted in Stark, supra note 132 
(explaining that “the professor is not free to offer a course of instruction within the university 
which has not been approved by the appropriate academic bodies” at 232); Stark, supra note 
132 (explaining that “our freedom is conditioned by the nature of our teaching assignments: 
the subject matter of our courses” at 232); Hogan & Trotter, supra note 142 (“While academic 
freedom protects the right of the scholar to pursue truth through their research and teaching, 
institutions have the right to determine who can teach which courses, what may be taught in 
those courses, and who should be admitted into the university” at 71).
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that property law includes common law property law, that is not a violation 
of academic freedom.172 Likewise, being assigned to teach an Indigenous 
law course, or being assigned to teach property law when the properly 
approved course description establishes that the course covers, say, both 
common law and Anishinaabe law of property, is not a violation of academic 
freedom. As Horn explains, academic freedom does not “confer the liberty 
to teach whatever catches one’s fancy. Course content may depend on the 
choices made by individual professors, but the subjects to be taught must be 
authorized by academic bodies.”173
Horn’s passage recognizes two points. The first is that instructors may 
be entitled to determine the specific topics they cover in their courses, 
even if they are not entitled to dictate their teaching assignments.174 An 
172 In such a case, requiring the instructor assigned to the course to teach common 
law property law, and imposing discipline if he or she refuses to do so, is not a violation of 
that person’s academic freedom. However, depending on the precise wording of the properly 
approved course description, the instructor may be entitled to teach more than just common 
law property law, as long as common law property law is also adequately covered. This is 
illustrated by University of Ottawa v Assn of Professors of the University of Ottawa (Rancourt 
Grievance), [2008] OLAA No 356 (QL) (grievance arbitration) [University of Ottawa]: where 
the instructor of a physics course described the course online as being about social and 
political activism, and the university argued that that description was unacceptable insofar 
as it “effectively removed the scientific content from the description of the course to in 
effect convert a course on science into a course on social activism (ibid at paras 48, 76). The 
arbitration decision concerned only this description and not the actual content of the course, 
as the university and the instructor reached a settlement when the university was assured 
that sufficient science content was still being covered in the course (ibid at paras 65, 67). The 
arbitrator held that the instructor’s description adequately conveyed the scientific content of 
the course and that the statements describing the course as being about social and political 
activism “fell legitimately within the scope of his academic freedom in pursuing a different 
pedagogical approach to draw students into the learning of science” (ibid at paras 76, 82).
173 Horn, supra note 131 at 6. See also Hogan & Trotter, supra note 142 at 71.
174 This principle is also subject to limitations imposed by the properly authorized 
academic body, as illustrated by the decision in Assoc des professeures et professeurs à temps 
partiel de l’Université Concordia c Université Concordia (grief de Dracopoulos), 2014 CanLII 
22795 (QC SAT), 2014 LNSARTQ 137. Mr. Dracopoulos, a contract lecturer, was directed to 
use a particular textbook in a course he was assigned to teach. Mr. Dracopoulos refused, as 
he had been planning to use a different textbook, and as a result his contract was cancelled 
(ibid at para 25). The academic freedom provision in the relevant collective agreement stated 
that academic freedom “protects each part-time faculty member’s freedom to … express and 
disseminate the results of their scholarly activities in a reasonable manner, (and) to select, 
acquire and disseminate their chosen documents and materials in the exercise of their 
professional responsibilities, without interference from the Employer or its agents” (ibid). 
Despite this provision, the arbitrator upheld the decision to cancel the contract given that the 
specified textbook as well as the outline for the course, had been approved by the institution’s 
senate (ibid at paras 40, 52). See also University of Ottawa, supra note 172 (holding that 
instructors must be given “some latitude for flexibility both as to the teaching methods and 
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Indigenous content requirement, then, should be articulated at the same 
level of generality as the course descriptions for non-Indigenous courses. 
This requirement is unproblematic; there is no a priori reason why a course 
description for an Indigenous law course would be articulated with more 
specificity than course descriptions for non-Indigenous courses. 
Horn’s second point refers to the academic bodies that have oversight 
over a university’s course offerings. He is alluding to a principle closely 
associated with academic freedom, namely, collegial governance, according 
to which academic bodies such as committees, faculty councils, and senates, 
as opposed to the administration, are responsible for academic decisions, 
such as approving courses and course descriptions.175 Most, if not all, law 
schools in Canada operate within universities governed by such a bicameral 
system. An Indigenous content requirement must emerge from the proper 
application of these procedures.176 Again, this requirement is unproblematic; 
to my knowledge, no concerns have been raised about Indigenous content 
requirements being imposed without being approved by the appropriate 
academic body. Likewise, many of the collective agreements and employee 
handbooks pertaining to law schools in Canada set out guidelines for 
allocating the teaching assignments of faculty members each year. Naturally, 
courses with an institutionally-approved Indigenous content requirement 
must be assigned in accordance with any such guidelines. Again, this should 
be unproblematic. There is no a priori reason why such guidelines would be 
violated in the case of Indigenous law courses.
specific content of a course” but “academic freedom does not extend to allowing a professor 
to introduce changes which effectively contradict or radically depart from the fundamental 
concept of the course as originally established” at para 80).
175 Contra John Lachs, “Shared Governance Is a Myth” (2011) 57:23 Chronicle High 
Education (arguing that collegial governance is a myth). Collegial governance is sometimes 
described as a component of academic freedom, although, like the concept of academic 
freedom, no universally recognized formulation or definition of collegial governance exists: 
see University of Calgary, supra note 140 at paras 354, 355. Collegial governance can also 
operate as a legitimate limitation on an individual’s academic freedom, as illustrated in 
University of Ottawa, supra note 172, where an arbitrator held that a university was justified in 
disciplining an instructor who described his course as being a bilingual graduate course when 
the senate-approved course description established that the course was an undergraduate 
course offered in French (ibid para 83). According to the arbitrator, no principle of academic 
freedom permits an instructor to publicly misrepresent the description of a course as 
approved by the senate (ibid para 74).
176 That being said, academic bodies are not entitled to refuse to approve courses, 
including mandatory Indigenous courses, merely because they disagree with the content: see 
Malloch, supra note 171 at 11, cited in Stark, supra note 132 (arguing that the “fact that courses 
of instruction must be approved before they can be offered does not authorize departments 
or faculty councils to reject course proposals as a means of excluding methodologies or 
orientations which they find uncongenial” at 233).
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177 See Venton, supra note 7.
178 See Horn, supra note 131 at 328; Dobson, supra note 157 at 244; Stark, supra note 
132 at 232-33. Contra Dobson, supra note 157 at 244 (arguing “that there is a legitimate role 
for political correctness in many aspects of the academy’s functioning”); Stark, supra note 132 
(arguing that “academics are not harmed by what some label ‘politically correct’ behaviour” 
at 232).
179 See Hook, supra note 159 at 6; Dobson, supra note 157 at 244; Byrne, supra note 
137 at 315–16. 
180 Stark, supra note 132 at 232, 233.
181 See e.g. Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian 
Sovereignty: An Essay on R v Sparrow” (1991) 29:2 Alta L Rev 498 at 501, 510–12.
182 See John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 2002) at 116–19.
183 See Mark Bennett, “‘Indigeneity’ as Self-Determination” (2005) 4 Indigenous LJ 
71.
Some may argue that an Indigenous content requirement also threatens 
academic freedom insofar as instructors may feel pressure to teach in a 
particular way or to espouse a particular view in these courses.177 It may 
be tempting to label this pressure as “political correctness”, which has long 
been pejoratively characterized as a threat to academic freedom.178 To 
evaluate this claim, it is necessary to understand what it is about political 
correctness that is thought to be so pernicious. It cannot be the mere fact 
of being subjected to critique, as critique is the lifeblood of the academic 
enterprise and is essential to the underlying purpose of academic freedom, 
namely, engaging in the search for truth. It is through continually subjecting 
our current theories to critique that we can hope to move ever closer to the 
truth. Scholars consistently explain that having one’s argument subjected to 
criticism based on the standards of the discipline is a legitimate limitation of 
one’s academic freedom, not a violation of it.179
What is thought to be so problematic about political correctness, 
then, is its supposed appeal to standards other than rigorous academic 
standards. When an argument is characterized as being about “political 
correctness”, the implication is that the argument is based on the desires 
of “special interest groups” and not on merit.180 Whether this is accurate 
depends on the particular argument at issue. There is no reason to assume 
the arguments of Indigenous communities, Indigenous scholars, and allies 
advocating for particular positions within a mandatory Indigenous law 
course would be based on anything other than merit. On the contrary, we 
may use as an example some of the most prominent critiques of Canada’s 
assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and Indigenous lands that 
appeal to legal and normative principles—such as equality,181 the rule of 
law,182 and the right to self-determination183—each of which constitutes 
accepted standards within academic and legal discourse. In the light of this 
scholarship, those who want to teach that Canada’s assertion of sovereignty 
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is legitimate have a scholarly obligation to respond to the substance of 
these critiques.184 Dismissing arguments as appeals to political correctness 
without engaging with their substance is a way to trivialize those arguments 
and forestall debate on the merits of the issue.185 In this context, accusations 
of political correctness pose the real threat to academic freedom; it is the 
academic freedom of those accused of political correctness that is under 
attack, not the academic freedom of those who brandish the barb. 
5. Conclusion
Many law schools are embracing the call to include Indigenous law as a 
mandatory component within their curricula. Not all reactions, though, 
have been positive. Articulating a clear rationale for an Indigenous content 
requirement is essential to formulating a persuasive response to critics. 
Without such a rationale, critics may assume that mandatory Indigenous 
content is a waste of time for students who do not plan to practise in the 
area of Indigenous issues, or that a particular viewpoint will be mandated 
in violation of the principle of academic freedom. The rationale sketched 
by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and by the Canadian Bar 
Association points toward the potential of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, to foster reconciliation. Thus far, most courts have failed to comply 
with the Supreme Court of Canada’s exhortation to inform the interpretation 
of section 35 rights with Indigenous laws. This failure is not necessarily due 
to any lack of enthusiasm or good will on the part of judges, as illustrated 
by Justice Vickers’ attempts to engage meaningfully with Tsilhqot’in law. 
It is due to a lack of substantive knowledge about Indigenous ontologies, 
epistemologies, logics, and ethics, and a lack of skill in identifying legal 
principles within sources such as Indigenous stories, Indigenous languages, 
and the land. Many judges lack these skills because they were never trained 
in them. A student may know during law school that she or he has no 
interest in Indigenous legal issues, but a law student cannot know with any 
certainty whether she or he will one day become a judge. Indigenous law 
must be mandatory so that our future judges receive the training they need 
to contribute to reconciliation. An Indigenous law requirement ensures that 
184 See Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada & Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Ottawa: 
December 2014), online: <www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2-2014/TCPS_2_FINAL_
Web.pdf> [TCPS 2 2014] (explaining that “[w]ith academic freedom comes responsibility 
… including … duties of … rigorous analysis … and adherence to the use of professional 
standards” at 5).
185 See Stark, supra note 132 at 233, 235. See e.g. Horn, supra note 131 (noting that the 
phrase “political correctness” was initially applied to feminists, at 327, but also characterizes 
those to whom the phrase is applied as attempting “to limit debate and confine teaching, 
research, and publication to nonthreatening topics” at 328).
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those who need the training most—those with no interest in Indigenous 
issues—will get it. 
A number of implications flow from this rationale. One is the answer to 
the question of whether Indigenous law should be taught in a stand-alone 
course or whether it should be incorporated throughout the curriculum: 
The two options are not mutually exclusive. The latter option is valuable 
as a means of avoiding the marginalization of Indigenous law. The former 
option is valuable as a means of teaching the epistemologies, ontologies, 
logics, and ethics that underlie Indigenous laws. The differences between 
an Anishinaabe epistemology, for example, and a western epistemology 
illustrate the importance of employing Anishinaabe pedagogies such as 
talking circles and land-based learning in a course on Anishinaabe law. 
Another aspect of the rationale for a mandatory Indigenous law course 
is the need to teach future judges how to apply Indigenous law to novel 
situations in order to resolve legal issues in the same way that the common 
law is used to resolve legal issues. One way to accomplish this goal is to 
have students apply Indigenous law to hypothetical fact scenarios. In my 
Indigenous Legal Traditions course, I combine these techniques by having 
students apply Anishinaabe law to a hypothetical fact scenario in a talking 
circle, using talking circle protocols. 
The concern that an Indigenous content requirement violates academic 
freedom is unwarranted. Academic freedom in neither sense—neither 
university autonomy nor the freedom of individual professors—is harmed 
by an Indigenous content requirement. University autonomy in the sense 
of institutional neutrality does not mean that the institution’s courses, 
programs, and degrees must be utterly free of political influences. Such a 
state of affairs is inconceivable. Institutional neutrality merely prohibits the 
university from impeding the academic freedom of individual professors. 
The purpose of academic freedom, in this second sense, is to facilitate 
the search for truth, which is why professors cannot be forced to endorse 
views with which they disagree. A mandatory Indigenous law course does 
not impede this purpose because the instructor of an Indigenous law 
course is not mandated to espouse any particular position in the course. 
The instructor may feel pressure, which some might be tempted to label 
“political correctness”, to endorse a particular position. This pressure is not 
a violation of academic freedom when it is rooted in arguments that engage 
legitimate debate. A mandatory Indigenous law course poses no greater 
threat to academic freedom than does a mandatory property law course.
